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Abstract—Drone jamming platforms are faced with a significant
constraint on bandwidth limitation compared to the broadband
spectrum used by remote control radio links in view of imple-
menting the advanced techniques of spread spectrum on these
devices. In this work, we propose a hardware solution to overcome
the bandwidth limitation of drone jamming platforms by using the
dual AD9361 transceiver integrated on the AD-FMCOMMS5-EBZ
radio prototyping platform. The hyperchaotic generator of random
digital signals and the custom control architecture have been
implemented on the ZC706 FPGA development board. A versatile
real time chaotic signals generation IP have been developed
and integrated on the FMCOMMS5-EBZ HDL reference design
considering timing constraints related to the AD9361 data exchange
and the AXI-LITE bus interface. The experimental results showed
a coverage capacity of more than 100 MHz of bandwidth, which
made it possible to guarantee an integral coverage of the WIFI
band and consequently to neutralize consequently any potential
threat evolving on this band.
Index Terms—jamming, chaotic system, hardware design, SoC,
AD9361, high performance FPGA embedded platform, wideband
wireless signal, software defined radio.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, the communication between drone and its remote-
control system is established using high-performance techniques
that allow them to operate in an environment characterized by a
high rate of interference, [1]. These interferences result from the
coexistence of multiple users sharing the same communication
medium, and, the sources of intentional interferences such as
jammers. In fact, the WI-FI band is an open access wireless
support for any kind of low power, non-licensed transmitters.
Spread spectrum techniques are often the most used technique
by drone communication systems, [2].These techniques extend
the spectral band occupied by the control signals, by the
application of a pseudo random bit sequence on the data in
the case of ”Direct Sequence Spreading Spectrum, DSSS” or
by the use of a pseudo random carrier frequency set in the
case of ”Frequency Hopping Spreading Spectrum, FHSS”, [2].
Consequently, the RF link between the drone and its remote
control-system strengthens its immunity against intentional and
unintentional interferences by reducing the signal-to-noise ratio
needed to establish the communication while maintaining a
minimum of performance and increasing the margin jamming,
[1]. The purpose of this paper is to counter the potential
threat posed by drones by neutralizing the radio link between
the targeted drone and its remote control-system.The principle
consists in the formation a more powerful jamming signal,
along the occupied band, to deteriorate the performance of
the drone receiver by increasing the bit error rate. Statistically,
this jamming signal must ideally approach a white noise with
a constant spectral density. This feature makes it possible to
interfere with all spectral components of the target signal with
the same probability. In addition, it is noted that remote control
systems are the main axis of attack against drones. In fact, the
communication between drone and its control system do not
respect any common standard and each designer uses its own
private parameters. Therefore, using a barrage jamming type is
the appropriate choice in this context, [3]. Indeed, jammers are
categorized into four main classes, namely: barrage, tone, sweep
and protocol-aware jamming, [4]. The performance of drone
receivers under different types of jammers has been the subject
of several studies in the literature. In [3], the author showed
that barrage jamming is the best technique when there is no
prior information on the parameters of the targeted system. With
respect to monotone jammers, it has been shown in [2] that it is
ineffective against FHSS systems; unlike a well-distributed mul-
titone jammer, which has been remarkably effective for DSSS
systems. In [5], it has been shown that the performances of the
WLANs based on 802.11 standard degrade significantly under
the effect of sweeping jamming using particular jump periods.
In [6], [7], it has been shown that protocol-aware jamming can
achieve effective jamming with very low energy requirements
and low probability of detection of the jamming signal. In this
work, we have designed a jammer device based on the statistical
properties of chaotic systems which are widely used in cryp-
tography and data security. We propose an appropriate model,
whose jamming signals are obtained by quadrature amplitude
modulation scheme. We customize the HDL reference design
of the rapid prototyping SDR system AD-FMCOMMS5-EBZ
to integrate the real time jamming signal generator based on
hyperchaotic system. The characteristics of this SDR platform,
particularly: the integration of two transceivers with 56 MHz
bandwidth, allow us to target separately and in the same time the
two sub-bands of WIFI support: (2.4 to 2.45 GHz) and (2.45 to
2.5 GHz). We implement the entire architecture, which include
the developed HC generator IP and the dual AD9361 transceiver
control system, on the Zynq ZC706 evaluation board, , ensuring
full coverage of the operating target band.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we
recall some general concepts on the jamming of the communi-
cation systems. Then, in Section III, we present the architecture
of the proposed jamming device as well as the specification of
the different modules allowing the realization of this device. In
Section IV, we present the integration of the designed HC gen-
erator on the dual transceiver control architecture AD9361. We
demonstrate the laboratory performed device and experimental
results in Section V. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in
Section VI as well as some scope for future works on this topic.
II. JAMMING REQUIREMENTS AND PRINCIPLES
Before presenting the model of our jammer, we describe,
in this subsection, the main principles of the chosen jamming
technique employed in this work as well as the barrage jamming
in its simplest form as is thoroughly detailed in [2]. The metric
expressing the jamming efficiency is the bit error rate (BER),
which is a function of the SNR at the RF terminal of the drone
receiver [2]. A successful jam requires a BER of 0.1 or higher,
[2]. Our goal is then to decrease the signal to noise ratio by
increasing the jamming to signal ratio JSR. The equations (1
and 2) give the expression of these parameters:








The Barrage jamming affects essentially the channel capacity
of a communication system across the entire portion of spectrum
occupied by the target with full duty cycle, both in the case
of DSSS or FHSS communication technique. Therefore, this
way is the best solution is to jam a remote-control system with
unknown parameters.
III. THE PROPOSED JAMMING MODEL AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
We propose a jamming model that is based on a typical
transmission chain using the Quadrature Amplitude Modulation
scheme. The Fig.1 illustrates the different modules composing
the jamming device.
Fig. 1. Jamming model diagram.
the critical parameters of this architecture are the choice of the
random digital signals generator, the bandwidth which is defined
by The cutoff frequency fcuttof and the carrier frequency. Given
these parameters, the band occupied by each transmission chain
is expressed by the following equation.
Bjamming = [flo − fcuttof , flo + fcuttof ] (3)
The Fig.2 shows the set channels used by WIFI LANs with
reference to the standard IEEE 802.11, [8]. By projection on
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of Wi-Fi channels in the 2.4 GHz band.
the parameters of the system to be attacked and to ensure a
full coverage of the target band, we find two main technical
requirements, namely: a suitable choice of carrier frequencies
and a bandwidth parameter which enables to cover the full range
of the WIFI band. For this purpose, it is proposed to subdivide
the target band into two sub-bands. The first varies from 2400
MHz to 2450 MHz and the second from 2450 to 2500 MHz.
Therefore, by choosing a 2425 MHz carrier frequency of the first
transciever and a 2475 MHz as a carrier frequency of the second
transciever, we hope to cover the integrity of the channels used
for the instantaneous communication of radio controls between
the drone and its remote control system.
To perform the architecture given by the model, we propose
to implement the jamming signal generator on a digital platform.
It is a hyperchaotic generator based on the resolution of a four-
dimensional nonlinear differential Lorenz system. We make this
choice in relation to the quality of its statistical properties.
Then, the first and the second determined solutions are matched
to the two components in phase quadrature necessary for the
first modulator. Similarly, the third and the forth modulator
are matched to the second modulator. Regarding the signal
conditioning, modulation and RF conversion part, we go through
a radio frequency controller with good performance in terms
of robustness and reconfiguration. This is the FMCOMMS5-
EBZ radio prototyping platform based on the built-in transceiver
system AD9361. This transceiver is characterized by a wide
operating bandwidth (70MHz-6000 MHz) with a channel width
ranging from 200 kHz to 56 MHz. Therefore, it is fully
compatible with the working band of remote controller com-
munication systems. The ZC706 evaluation board will serve as
a development platform for the implementation of the Pseudo
Random Sequence Generator as well as the control architecture
of the radio frequency converter.
IV. THE CONTROL ARCHITECTURE
In our design flow, we base on the ”design reuse” approach by
modifying the original HDL reference design given by Analog
Device. This approach allows saving the development time
while providing a great effort of the architecture decortication.
Indeed, the package relating to the FMCOMMS5-EBZ card
includes an editable block design as well as software APIs
allowing the configuration of the different architecture IP cores.
Therefore, the object is to customize the transmission chain of
the AD9361 transceiver by interfacing the data generator accord-
ing to the technical specifications defined in the jammer model.
The Fig.3 illustrates the main features of this architecture. It is
implemented on a ZC706 evaluation board. The hardware design
contains on a Programming Logic PL part including cores such
as AD9361 core, FIFOs, communication bridges and as well as
the developed HC generator. The zynq Processing System PS,
based on dual ARM Cortex-A9, represent the part who supports
the communication with the peripherals such as UART, Ethernet
and interactions with the integrated cores using AXI protocol
through High Performance HP ports. Therefore, NO Operating
System software ensure the control of this architecture. The
chip receives control signals produced by the dual ad9631 cores







































































































































































































Fig. 3. Hardware design of the control architecture.
A. The HC generator formatting and packaging
We package the Lorenz resolution entity to design an IP core
with a custom interface performing, simultaneously, the data
exchange with the dual AD9361 cores and interactions with the
ARM processor to take advantage of its versatility as shown in
the Fig.4.
First, the synthesized resolution circuit is instantiated in the
data-formatting unit that is on a higher hierarchy. This entity
processes the contents of the buses (X, Y, Z and W) at the
output of the Lorenz system’s resolution circuit according to
the state expressed by the signals (valid and enable) coming
from the dual AD9361 cores shown in the Fig.4. It is important
to note that the design of the resolution entity is adapted to
the data exchange protocol while ensuring the synchronization
between the cores by producing a new sample every each request
transmitted by the AD9361 core. Each AD9361 core has four
data inputs representing (I1, Q1, I2 and Q2). In our case, we use
the first transmit channel of the first transceiver by connecting
the X output to the first data input of the DAC core, the Y output
to the second DAC data input. For the second transceiver, we
use the Z and W outputs connected to the 5th and the 6th DAC
data input. The size of the bus is 16 bits for each component and
therefore corresponds to the fractional part of each dimension
of the hyperchaotic generator system. The two AD9361 cores
are in master position with respect to the HC generator, which
is in slave position. Before packaging the entity thus obtained
by the Vivado tool, we design a slave AXI LITE port with
four registers. These registers are accessible for reading and
writing by the ARM processor. Thus, we bring controllability
to the generator by matching the reset and start signals on one
of these registers. In parallel, we develop software commands
to write and read on these registers where each value of these
registers gives a specific behavior of the HC generator. The
Fig. 4. The modified reference design.
integration of the HC generator in the reference design is shown
in the Fig.4. It is equivalent to a FIFO write interface, which is
connected with the read side of the DAC FIFO from which the
first and the second AD9361 core read the data and transmits
it to the dual AD9361 CHIP. Note that the integration of the
new IP involve automatically a slight modification on the HDL
design AXI CPU INTERCONNECT by adding a new port on
the bridge, which is completely normal to support the new
AXI LITE connectivity. In addition, according to the HDL
design clock routing, we use the mother clock signal of the
AD9361 core to clock the resolution sub-circuit given that this
clock goes four time faster than the effective data rate. Thus, we
guarantee the synchronization between the HC generator core
and the dual AD9361 core.
V. THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present at first the specifications of a
4 channels WIFI targeted commercial drone remote control
system. Fig.5 shows a visualization of remote control signals
on a spectrum analyzer with cumulating mode. We can easily
conclude that the radio link use frequency hopping between 4
Fig. 5. Drone RF link specifications.
identified channels, as well as 2417, 2427, 2447 and 2452 MHz.
The jamming barrage must be able to block the whole of this
spreading band that is the perfect case of the ad-fmcomms5-ebz
system performance.
Running the elf file, result of Software Defined Radio appli-
cation compilation with the specified parameters, on the PS part
of the zc706 card and visualization of the RF terminal in the
spectrum analyzer gives us the evolution represented in Fig.6
and the Fig.7.
Fig. 6. Firt Tx channel spectrum output.
Analyzing these figures, we can note that the whole spectrum
band was efficiently occupied, covering the different frequencies
used by the remote controllers. Furthermore, the quality spectral
density of the generated signal is uniform along the jammed
band allowing a jamming effect with the same probability.
This effect returns to the statistical parameters of the jamming
sequence obtained by the chaotic generator. In addition, the fact
of bypassing the analog filter in the transmission chain gives rise
to a spectral window that is not perfect on the edges, which
makes it possible to involve the neighboring components in the
barrage jamming attack with enough amplification.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown the utility of the Lorenz chaotic
generator in terms of jamming remote control system of drones.
Fig. 7. Second Tx channel spectrum output.
Spectral coverage efficiency has been shown through experi-
mental measurements to counter all kinds of spread spectrum
techniques. The main contributions of this work is the hardware
design of chaos signals generator with taking into account
the timing requirement to make a real time interfacing with
principal IP AD9361 controller. Thus, this customized IP will
give another fields of applications such as securing streaming
data. As future works, one can study the robustness and the
agility of the rapid prototyping platform in addition to the re-
configurability of the control design will allow us to develop
other techniques of jammers in order to make our embedded
system to consume less energy and with a low probability
detection. For example, the 4 by 4 receive chain can be exploited
to develop a reactive jammer by making characterisation of the
targeted communication drone system parameters and adequate
the transmit chain to these estimated parameters.
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